End to the China Lobby

One of the enduring features of the American political landscape since the end of World War II was the China Lobby. The China Lobby was committed to defending the Kuomintang, or Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek, when he was in power on the mainland and later to defending Taiwan, where he took refuge in 1949, from being taken over by the Communists.

For many years the China Lobby was as powerful and influential in Washington as AIPAC, the Israeli lobby is today. But the China Lobby today is a pale reflection of its once domineering presence. In fact, the Washington establishment, while still publicly voicing undying formal support for Taipei, is turning downright hostile to the island and its leaders.

President George W. Bush was potentially the most Taiwan-friendly president in decades. Soon after he took office, he said the U.S. would do “anything it takes” to ensure Taiwan’s de facto independence from the mainland. In its first year the Bush administration raised Beijing’s ire by approving a $18 billion arms acquisition deal with Taipei, the largest arms sale package in a decade. It was a powerful sign that Washington remained committed to Taiwan’s defense.

Six years later, relations are seriously strained. It is probable that President Bush dislikes Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian almost as much as he dislikes South Korea’s President Roh Moon-hyun. And he dislikes Roh almost as much as dislikes North Korea’s Kim Il Sung. And he says he loathes Kim. So that should tell you something.

But what about the Taiwan Relations Act? Doesn’t that act commit the U.S. to defending Taiwan in any confrontation with China? Well, not exactly. Many in Washington are taking a closer look at the 1979 law and finding that, lo, it does not commit the U.S. to go to war under any circumstances. It commits Washington to “enable” Taiwan to defend itself and to maintain sufficient “capabilities” nearby to defer any Chinese adventurism.

Recently, Sen. John Warner (R-Va), an establishment figure if there ever was one, issued a blunt warning to Taiwan: “If a conflict with China were to be aided by inappropriate and wrongful politics generated by the Taiwanese elected officials, I am not entirely sure that this nation would come full force to the rescue.” The words, hardly noticed in Washington, reverberated through the Chinese community.

There can be little doubt that the U.S. has lived up to its side of the bargain. In addition to the arms authorization package, dating back to 2001, the U.S. continues to maintain a strong military capability in the region. Indeed, it is shifting more naval resources to the Pacific. In recent years Washington has also strengthened its position through agreements with Japan that appear to tie that country closer into supporting any defensive actions in the Taiwan Strait.

Meanwhile, Taiwan has been agonizingly slow in expanding and modernizing its own defenses. Five years after it was first authorized, the Taiwan legislature has yet to appropriate the money needed to purchase the weapons. The weapons package has been defeated more than 40 times, even though the cost has been pared to about $14 billion. It has become a kind of political soccer ball to be kicked and head-butted in the game of Taiwan domestic politics. .

Washington has also become increasingly irritated with President Chen Shiu-bien relentless efforts to move Taiwan along the road to independence. Chen has resurrected all of the old pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party tropes, including rewriting the constitution (which conceivably could define Taiwan as an independent Republic of Taiwan), re-applying for admission to the U.N under the name of Taiwan and, most provocatively, proposing to abolish the National Unification Council.

The NUC was established in the early 1990s when the Kuomintang Party governed Taiwan. It makes eventual reunification under mutually agreeable terms official policy. The council has been a dead letter since the DPP gained power in the historic 2000 election. It has no members and a derisory budget. Still, symbolically it has importance, which was on reason why Washington has been warning Taipei not to dismantle it in total.

For Beijing there are two main things that could, in theory, persuade the mainland to attack. One would be any action that moved Taiwan from de facto to de jure independence, such as formally changing the name to the Republic of Taiwan. The other might come if Beijing calculated that Taiwan had swung decisively toward independence, even without a formal declaration. That’s why, for Taiwan’s own safety, it is important that the parties remain open to the notion of reunification at some vague future time.

In past two or three months, Washington has sent a steady stream of messengers to Taipei to urge Chen to tone things down. It culminated in the recent visit by former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, an unusually high-ranking visitor for Taiwan, who urged Taipei to spend more on its own defense. In deference to the Americans Chen modified his position slightly, deciding merely to “suspend” the NUC rather than abolish it outright.

Chen’s public approval ratings range from 10 to 20 percent depending on which poll one reads. His party suffered devastating losses in December’s local elections. It is considered almost certain the Kuomintang will wrest the presidency back in the presidential election in 2008. Taipei mayor Ma Ying-jeiu is widely expected to be the standard bearer. Looking at all this Chen decided that the best defense was a strong offense.

He is clearly calculates that taking such bold moves might provoke Beijing into doing something threatening, which would rally more voters behind the DPP. That is what happened exactly ten years ago this month (March) when Beijing lobbed ballistic missiles near the island’s northern tip. Since then Beijing has learned to play a shrewder game. It is wooing Taiwan, especially the business class, with more incentives. Taiwan enjoyed a trade surplus of some $58 billion last year.

But Beijing walks a pretty narrow line. If it seems too threatening, it strengthens anti-China forces on Taiwan. If it is too passive, it undermines its own position that Taiwan is a part of China. It is thought that Beijing’s action a year ago this month to adopt a law promising to use force to prevent Taiwan from declaring independents – the so-called anti-secession law – was as much to stiffen its own backbone as it was to intimidate Taiwan.

The Kuomintang leader has promised that if he wins the next presidential election in 2008, which seems likely, he would shift Taiwan sharply away from the confrontational, policies followed by President Chen. There is no doubt who Beijing will be rooting for. Washington too. But the election is still a long way off, and there is plenty of time for more mischief.