Obama Sidesteps Bases Issue

It might come under the category of something that couldn’t have happened at a worse time. Less than one week before President Barack Obama arrived in Japan for a visit, a U.S. soldier was taken into custody on Okinawa in connection with a hit and run incident in which an elderly Okinawan man was killed.

It is, of course, incidents like this one, rare though they may be, not to mention noise, congestion and other daily irritants, that led Japan and the U.S. to negotiate a complex deal to lower the American military’s large “footprint” on the southern island, an agreement that has ballooned into a major alliance crisis in some minds.

In 2006 the two governments agreed and in early 2009 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed, an agreement under which Washington would withdraw 8,000 Marines and their families from Okinawa to Guam and close the Futenma Air Station in southern part of the island that is now totally surrounded by urban development.

In return, Tokyo agreed to foot a major portion of the estimated $10 billion relocation costs and build, also at Japan’s expense, the Marines a new high tech heliport on reclaimed land at a another, less populated location on Okinawa in the township of Nago.

In October Secretary of Defense Robert Gates laid down a strong marker saying bluntly that a deal is a deal and that Washington could not entertain any but minor adjustments. Move Futenma to another part of Okinawa or the whole deal is off, he said.

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) came to power with one main fixed idea: that government ministers, not the civil servants, should be making policy. On the Futenma issue that has led to some confusion. Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa favors implementing the agreement as is. Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada wants to merge Futenma with the big U.S. Air force Base at Kadena,

But the final decision will be made by the new prime minister? Yukio Hatoyama, and he has yet to take a position one way or the other, except to say he wants to postpone any decision pending the outcome of a series of national and local elections coming in the new year.

Despite Gates, President Obama and his advisors reluctantly agreed to side step this issue during his visit, which began Saturday and give the new government a little latitude to reach a consensus “It will take several months for the new Japanese administration to become fully functional; we have to be patient,” Said Kurt Campbell, Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

But it is also clear that Washington’s patience will wear thin pretty quickly. Every day that the decision is postponed brings forth more news stories and opinion pieces lamenting the “troubled U.S.-Japanese alliance.” Pretty soon they may become a kind of self-fulfilling prophesy. Washington wants to wrap this deal up by year’s end.

Hatoyama says he wants to defer a final decision at least until the election for Mayor of Nago, the host town for the new air base, scheduled for January. Beyond that is the July election for the half of the House of Councillors, the upper house of Japan’s bicameral parliament, and next November for the governor of Okinawa.

It is hard to know what Hatoyama expects to gain from delay. Perhaps he is hoping that incumbent Nago Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukaru, who supports the new heliport in his town, will win re-election and give him some political cover for implementing the deal.

But public feelings against the relocation plan are rising rapidly on Okinawa, and even the Nago mayor is beginning to back pedal. “My stance remains unchanged, but the best idea would be to relocate it out of [Okinawa] prefecture,” the mayor told the Asahi Shimbun newspaper.

Hatoyama is obviously hoping that the DPJ will gain a clear majority in the July upper house election, so he is no longer dependent on his coalition partners to pass bills. They include the Social Democratic Party, which is even more strongly opposed to relocation. That would give him some added flexibility.

On the other hand, the longer this matter drags on, the more likely it could become a campaign issue in that election. The opposition Liberal Democratic Party, practically prostrate in the aftermath of its pasting in the general election last August, is beginning to perk up, sensing that the new government might be vulnerable on the charge of endangering the alliance.

The new government, in office for less than two-months, is already losing some support in public opinion polls. They are now around 60 percent favorable, albeit from unsustainable high levels of euphoria immediately after the government formally took office in mid-October. Successes in two upper house by-elections, confirms basic public support for the new government.

The proposed halt in Japan’s contribution to the War on Terror through refueling coalition warships in the Indian Ocean, set to expire in January, is another sore point, although it has not been elevated to the position of a “test” of the alliance in the same way that the Okinawan base issue has.

Most of the refueling this year has been for Pakistani naval vessels, so it is hard to maintain that the operation is “vital” to operations in landlocked Afghanistan. On the other hand, a pullback here might encourage other nations with unpopular troop commitments to withdraw also.

Hatoyama will outline his substitute plan to contribute between $4 and $5 billion dollars over the next five years for expanded job training, agricultural development and other civilian support activities, but he is not prepared to send Self Defense force troops to the region to protect the aid workers.

A Deal's a Deal

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates last week staked out a hard line position over the relocation of the Futenma Marine Air Station in Okinawa to another location on the southern island during his recent trip to Japan to prepare the way for President Barack Obama’s expected visit next month.

As far as Washington is concerned, the elaborate plan to reshuffle troops on Okinawa and lower the island’s overall military “footprint”, which it negotiated with the previous government headed by the Liberal Democratic Party, is a done deal.

The U.S. will entertain only minor changes, such as shifting the proposed new runway a few meters further off shore. Inaction on relocation of the air station would jeopardize the agreed relocation of 8,000 Marines and their families to Guam, Gates said.

Gate’s remarks have elevated what was a fairly obscure technical matter into a major issue between Japan and the United States and the first great test of freshman Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama’s alliance management skills. Hatoyama entered office last month when his party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won an historic majority.

Futenma has been an American base since the end of World War II and a Marine Corps air station since 1960. It is currently home for about 3,000 Marines and an air group consisting mainly of helicopters. Over the years, the neighboring city of Ginowan has burgeoned from a village into a metropolis, now virtually surrounding the base and its runway.

It took years of negotiations for Washington and Tokyo to agree on a plan to realign the bases on Okinawa, a relatively small island which today supports about three quarters of the US military manpower in the country, so it is not surprising that Washington doesn’t want to start anew with a new government.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, anticipating a possible DPJ election victory as far back as last February, made sure to get the then government of prime minister Taro Aso to sign on the dotted line when she visited Japan in her first swing through Asia. The new government must honor the deal it predecessor made, she says now.

When it was in opposition, the DPJ made some sweeping demands about Okinawa. It opposed the idea of closing Futenma and building a new air station in northern part of the island on reclaimed (mostly coral) land. It wanted to move the air station out of Okinawa entirely. The party also criticized the $6 billion that Tokyo promised to help pay to relocate 8,000 Marines and their families to Guam.

However, as the election approached and prospect of holding power became more and more a reality, the DPJ has softened its position. The party’s official election manifesto merely called vaguely for re-examining future options for American bases in Japan.

In early October, Hatoyama said some things that made it seem that he could be persuaded to accept the agreement reached between Japan and the U.S. including relocating Futemna somewhere within Okinawa prefecture. Almost immediately he had to back pedal in the face of criticism from his coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, and others in his own party.

“While bearing in mind the wishes of the people in Okinawa, I will negotiate with the U.S. and come to a final conclusion in the matter,” the PM said. He said his government wanted to look into various unspecified “options” and would not feel obliged to determine its final policy by the time Obama visits.

One of the options might be to move the Marines to the massive Kadena Air Force Base. The base already is crowded, but an intriguing story was floated a month ago suggesting that the U.S. might withdraw the F-16 wing at Misawa air base in northern Japan and part of the F-15 Wing based at Kadena, The latter’s removal might open opportunities to relocate the Marine helicopters there.

The political forces favoring closing Futenma and against building a substitute in Okinawa prefecture are formidable. They include a most of the prefectural assembly, all four Diet members from Okinawa, most of Hatoyama’s large contingent of freshmen back benchers in the Diet, his coalition partner, the SDP and 68 percent of Okinawan people, according to recent polls.

A permanent tent city of protestors has been camped out on the beach at Hinoko township near where the new runway would be built, essentially daring the government to try and move them. How a determined minority, augmented by sympathizers, can frustrate Washington and Tokyo’s plans can be seen from two past examples.

In the 1950s the Americans determined to extend the runway at Tachikawa Air Base in the Tokyo suburbs, a move necessary to accommodate high performance jet aircraft. Protestors camped out at one end of the runway daring anyone to remove them literally for years. Eventually, the Americans gave up and moved out. Tachikawa is now a park dedicated, ironically, to Japan’s wartime emperor, Hirohito.

The dogged opposition of a handful of farmers, supported by outside admirers, permanently crippled Tokyo’s grand plan to build a major international airport in the rice fields of Narita far outside of Tokyo. Only this month has Narita opened an extended second runway, of a projected three runways, more than 40 years after the airport opened.

It may be that Secretary Gates was playing “bad cop” to President Obama’s “good cop” routine when he visits Tokyo on the first leg of his Asian trip in mid-November. That would permit the president to allow the new Japanese government to gain face by graciously reopening the negotiations. Meanwhile, after due reflection, Hatoyama graciously concedes the need to build a replacement air field in Okinawa. Everybody is happy.

That is one possible scenario. It is also possible that the American side will dig in its heels on the proposition that a deal is a deal, and decide that, for the sake of future alliance, it must demonstrate early on who is still the boss.

Macau Revisited

The first time I visited Macau was to find a smuggler. Nothing as exciting as opium, gold or indentured coolies, three Macau exports before it became a gambling emporium, of course. No, my flat mate in Hong Kong wanted to bring his treasured Burmese cats into Hong Kong and he could not abide being separated from them for the six-month quarantine then in effect in the British colony.

With the help of some of his friends in the then Portuguese enclave (not a “colony”, Chinese territory under Portuguese administration) we found the animal smuggler in a shop off of the main street, Avenida de Almieda Ribeira. For a sum he was quite willing to accept the cats and smuggle them into Hong Kong on a junk..

That was the beginning of a 20-year fascination with Hong Kong’s smaller neighbor across the Pearl River Delta. Looking back I am amazed at how much Macau has changed in that time. When I first went to Macau to look for an animal smuggler, the Senate Square, the heart of old Macau, looked decidedly run down. Not today. Cars have been banned and the square has been lovingly restored. Portuguese craftsmen were brought in to make a wavy white pavement out of limestone and basalt that gives it a definite Mediterrean look.

In those days the park at the top of the Monte Fort housed only the small headquarters for the Meterological Service. Then in 1994 an inspired decision was made to build in its place the Museum of Macau, comprising thee levels detailing the history of Macau and its people.

The nearby ruins of St Paula’s Church have also been “restored” to the extent that the area behind the stone façade has been smoothed over for easier walking, and a crypt for the Japanese and Vietnamese Christians who built the Church (400 year ago) has been added along with a sacred art museum, Of course, nobody would dream of rebuilding the church, even if plans existed, since the singularity of the standing stone wall is its chief fascination.

Some things have been lost forever. The old Praia Grande still had something of its original character, when I first visited, a languid place to stroll along the water front ride in a pedi cab, or sit on the balcony of the old Bela Vista Hotel and watch the sampans glide into the Outer Harbor. Now, the praia has been all but obliterated by a reclamation project that has created two artificial lakes.

I remember staying one night in the old Bela Vista before it was transformed by the Mandarin Oriental interests into one of the best boutique hotels in the World. Alas, that transformation was short lived, as the Portuguese government bought the place as the official residence of the post-handover Consul General.

Recently, I returned to Macau after an absence of six year in order to update my guide book, Discover Macau: Eight Walks in Macau, a Guide and History, first published in 2002 and now being reissued by Blacksmith Books in Hong Kong in anticipation of the 10th anniversary of the handover of Macau to China in December.

The Portuguese had scarcely moved out before the American gambling impresarios moved in, bringing with them some of the glitz and glamour of Las Vegas. In a move probably even more significant than the handover to China, Macau had split the gambling monopoly into three parts and awarded two of them Wynne Resorts and Sheldon Adelson, respectively owners of the Wynne Resort and Venetian Hotel Casino.

Everyone agreed that Macau’s gambling scene needed a face lift. It had neither the old-world charm of Monte Carlo nor the unbridled exuberance of Las Vegas. Few of the casinos offered any entertainment that could not be found by pulling the lever of slot machine. He casinos were tawdry, the dealers surly.

Tawdry is hardly the word to use for the sumptuous new gambling emporiums in today’s Macau, which among other things, boast a couple of Michelin-starred restaurants on the premises. The gaming rooms are as big as football fields, with hundred of tables for blackjack, roulette and other games of chance.

One has to wonder if there are enough gamblers in China, indeed all of the world, to fill tables. (In fact I noticed that several of the blackjack tables were empty, the dealers waiting patiently for new punters even though it was the beginning of China’s autumn Golden Week.)

Mine was not just uninformed impression, as representatives of the top gambling enterprises huddled in early October to consider whether the offerings might be outstripping the supply and to put a halt to breakneck expansion. That following on a decision in 2008 by Macau government to freeze new licenses and casino building permits.

The Chinese government too, goes through periods of handwringing over the temptations that the Macau fleshpots hold for cadres interested in taking a big portion of their country’s tax receipts to place on the Macau tables, and it recently restricted residents of neighboring Guangdong province to two trips a year.

When the gambling monopoly was announced, there was considerable worry among aficionados of old Macau that the other side of Macau, the historical side, the showcases churches, mansions, gardens and plazas would be ruined. It seems to me, however, that they coexist rather well.

Most of the new hotels cluster in two main places, including the flat pad of reclaimed land that is gradually making one island out of Macau’s two outlying islands Taipa and Coloane. The government pumps a healthy portion of its huge gambling tax revenue into restoration and preservation of its European heritage.

In 2005, Macau successfully sought to have what it terms “The Center of Macau”, with some 30 or so churches, temples, gardens and plazas declared a World Heritage Site, the 31st such site in China. That is certainly is something you won’t find in Las Vegas.

Early Days

The new Japanese government, headed by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama was one month old on Friday Oct. 16. His Democratic party of Japan (DPJ) swept into power on a powerful sentiment of change. It is, of course, early days, but it is not too soon to see if it is delivering on this promised change.

The prime minister himself spent much of his first month in office on the road, visiting New York and Pittsburgh for the opening of the United Nations and the G-20 Summit. He flew to Copenhagen to lobby for Tokyo’s unlikely bid to host the 2016 Olympic Games. Then he flew to Seoul and Beijing to meet with leaders of China and South Korea.

His cabinet ministers, however, have been in the news constantly. The cabinet had hardly been sworn in before Lands and Transport Minister Seiji Maehara flew to Gunma prefecture in central Japan to inspect the Yamba Dam project in central Gunma and declare it would be terminated.

The DPJ campaigned on the notion that the old regime spent too much taxpayer money on wasteful public works projects of which the Yamba Dam is the poster child. During the month the minister announced that the government was freezing construction of 48 of the 143 dam projects approved by the previous administration.

The Hatoyama government eventually plans to terminate about 100 dam projects budged at approximately 8 trillion yen in construction costs (some of the saving may be offset by local reimbursements for the disruption and job losses that will accompany these terminations.)

Indeed, Maehara is turning into something of a star of the new government’s first month in office. It seems as if he is on television every day meeting with prefectural officials over dam projects, conferring with Japan Airlines over bailout plans, meeting with local governments over plans to turn Haneda Airport into a major regional aviation hub, meeting, meeting, meeting . . .

Of course, the fact that he has movie-idol good looks doesn’t hurt, but it is also true that many of the new government’s most important initiatives fall under his portfolio, Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. This includes plans to eliminate the tolls on express ways and the “temporary” (in place for the past for past 30 years) gasoline surcharge to fund new road construction.

Maehara also has the Okinawa portfolio, and has made at least one inspection trip to the southern island, where the relocation of American forces is the hot topic. However, as it impacts relations with the U.S., it is likely that Hatoyama himself and Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada will take the lead in this sensitive issue.

If Maehara is the star of the month, then Shizuka Kamei, Minister for Postal Reform and Financial Services, is the “bad boy” of the new government. In his latter role, he went off the reservation early on by proposing a blanket debt moratorium on small businesses and some individuals.

The Hatoyama government clearly does not like this proposal, which some estimate could cost the country’s banks trillions of yen in lost interest. But it is not easy to rein him in. Kamei heads his own small party in coalition with the government and is not subject to party discipline. He is a loose cannon.

The government needs the votes, few as they are, of Kamei’s New People’s Party and its other coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party (SDR) since it is just short of a majority in the House of Councilors, the upper house of Japan’s bicameral parliament. One can assume that the DJP will strive mightily to win a clear majority in July’s election so that can dump its partners.

Another prominent figure in the new government is Yoshito Sengoku. As minister of state for administration he is the man responsible for finding and cutting the “waste” in government spending that it plans to apply to fulfill its campaign promise to provide cash allowances to parents and end tuition for secondary schools.

In the first month in office Sengoku reportedly has axed 2.5 trillion yen from the previous administration’s proposed 14 trillion yen supplementary budget. When finished, the party will be turn attention to cutting fat from the 2010 fiscal budget. The implementation of the child allowances will likely be incorporated into that budget, which goes into effect in April.

In other ways, the new administration is pointing to change, Justice Minister Keiko Chiba, the only woman besides SDP leader Mizuho Fukushima in the cabinet, wants to fulfill a long-time ambition of Japanese feminists to permit married women to keep their maiden name if they choose. She plans to introduce legislation permitting this when the Diet convenes later this month.

During the long period of Liberal Democratic Party government, 20 attempts were made to change the Civil Law to allow women to use their maiden names; all were defeated by conservatives who argued that such a change would impact family unity. The influx of many young freshmen legislators, many of them women, may change this.

It is also possible that Minister Chiba may lead a de facto moratorium capital punishment, as she is a member of the Parliamentary League for the Abolishment of the Death Penalty. The above-mentioned Kamei is also a longtime opponent who happens to head the League; SDP leader Fukushima also opposes the death penalty.

It falls to the justice minister to sign death warrants for convicted murderers after their appeals are exhausted. The number of executions was accelerating under the previous administration (Hatoyama’s brother Kunio signed 11 warrants when he was justice minister). There are about 100 prisoners on Japan’s death rows.

Matters impacting the alliance with the United States are likely to be put off until President Barack Obama’s visit in mid-November. However, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa said flatly that Japan’s refueling mission in the Indian Ocean will end in January when the authorization expires.

Washington seems to be taking this expected news equitably. It is more likely to resist any changes in plans agreed to with the previous government to relocate some American marine forces in Okinawa, and there were signs from Hatoyama this past week that the Japanese government may acquiesce in thism matter.

What Alliance?

There has been considerable handwringing in the Western press, especially among Americans, over the future of the U.S.-Japan military alliance under the new regime. Will Japan’s new masters seek to undermine the security of Asia and American interests by steering a more independent course?

Never mind that the incoming prime minister Yukio Hatoyama has stated that the alliance is fundamental to Japan’s security and that he has no intention of undermining what pundits on both sides of the Pacific persist in calling the “cornerstone” of America’s position in Asia.

A cornerstone, perhaps, but not an alliance. Japan is a close friend, fellow democracy, trading partner and increasingly a collaborator on the world stage. But it is not an ally. That is strictly a courtesy title, and since the health of the “alliance” is going to come under increasing scrutiny in coming months one should have a clearer idea of what it really is.

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, signed with Japan in 1960 replacing an earlier treaty, is basically a deal. The U.S. promises to defend Japan if it comes under attack, with nuclear weapons if necessary (the nuclear umbrella). In exchange, Japan provides the U.S. with bases which it can use as it sees fit to advance its greater security interests in Asia and as far as the Middle East.

Those bases are not necessarily designed, or at present even configured to merely defend Japan. In the past they have been staging areas for the Vietnam War and now the Afghanistan War. The largest air base near Tokyo, Yokota AFB, for example, hasn’t had a permanent collection attack aircraft or interceptors for decades. Indeed, according to Kyodo News Service, Washington is considering withdrawing the wing of F-16s at Misawa AFB and reducing the number of f-15s at Kadena AFB in Okinawa.

Japan, however, is not obligated to come to the defense of the U.S. if it is attacked. Indeed, it would be illegal for Tokyo to do so under the current liberal interpretation of its American-written constitution, which rather explicitly prohibits Japan from possessing any military force whatsoever.

This provision – Article 9 – has been interpreted broadly enough to permit Japan to build one of the largest and most sophisticated militaries on the globe. But the clause has still been interpreted in such a way as to prevent “collective defense” In other words, Japan can defend itself but not others.

Nobody worried much about collective defense during most of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was considered the main threat. But it has grown into an issue with the emergence of a bellicose nuclear-armed North Korea and to a lesser extent, the rapid modernization of China’s armed forces.

North Korea’s recent test of a multi-stage rocket in April, which it fired directly over Japan landing in the North Pacific, raised the interesting speculation whether Japan could legally shoot down a North Korean missile headed toward the U.S. that came within range. A strict reading of Japan’s laws would say no.

In another hypothetical, but possibly more realistic, scenario North Korean naval vessels intercept and threaten to sink or capture an unarmed or lightly armed American naval surveillance ship in international waters of the Sea of Japan. A Japanese destroyer happens to be close by. Does it come to the American vessel’s aid?

I would be willing to guess that Tokyo would order the destroyer to resist the North Koreans and let the legal chips fall where they may. The consequences of simply standing by and doing nothing would be politically devastating. The American public would never understand – or care about - the legal nuances “collective defense.”

(In the real U.S.S. Pueblo incident in 1968, the Japanese Self Defense Forces did not figure at all, nor, to my knowledge, were they called on for help. The U.S. had more assets in the region than it does now. That they could not be successfully deployed to defend the Pueblo from humiliating capture is another story).

When I came to Yokota as a junior officer shortly after the Pueblo Incident, U.S. forces in Japan and the Japanese Self Defense Forces might as well have existed on different plants. In all my time there I never once met a SDF officer. There was no liaison or coordination. No contact that I could see. Nothing. I never served in a NATO country, but I have to believe that there would have been much more social or professional intercourse with officers of the Royal Air force or the Belgian Air Force.

That began to change in the 1990s, the catalyst being the1991 Gulf War. Japan ponyed up billions of dollars to support the coalition, but, consistent with its anti-war principles, provided no troops. Tokyo was stunned afterwards at how ungrateful Washington and others were for their generous financial support. The wanted, to use the current vernacular, boots on the ground.

That began a slow evolution in Japan’s use of its military. The Diet (parliament) passed laws that allowed Japanese to participate in international peacekeeping missions in Cambodia and elsewhere. In 1996 Washington and Tokyo inked the Joint Security Declaration in which Japan promised to provide logistical support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan. Joint research in missile defenses was authorized.

In recent years Japanese armed forces have ventured far from Japan. For some years, a naval oiler has replenished ships, including American naval vessels, supporting operations over Afghanistan. But this had nothing to do with any kind of treaty obligation but more a general sense that Japan had to do something more in the War on Terror than write checks.

The defeated Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) made collective defense one of its manifesto planks. The triumphant Democratic part of Japan (DPJ) was silent on the matter. Speaking to journalists a couple months before the election, senior party leader Seiji Maehara dismissed the North Korean missile hypothetical as an “abstraction.”

This year, though, the Diet passed a law to formally authorize the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force (navy) to take part in anti-piracy patrols off the coast of Somalia. As part of the legislation, Japanese war ships were specifically authorized to come to the aid of non-Japanese vessels threatened by pirates. That may seem like an obvious thing, but in a sense it was revolutionary. It was the first time that Japan had taken a baby step toward collective defense.

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Tired Blood: LDP in Opposition

Spare a moment to reflect on the fate of Japan’s venerable Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as it surveys the wreckage from Sunday’s electoral tsunami that pushed the party from power for the first time since its founding in 1955.

Obviously, the big political story in Japan for the next few months will be whether the new masters, the Democratic Party of Japan (DJP), are up to prime time. Almost of equal importance is another question: Can the LDP survive in opposition?

After all, it has taken years for Japan’s democracy to evolve to the point where it has a two-party system, where two parties of roughly equal power alternate in power. It would be a shame if it turned out that the Sunday’s votes had simply exchanged one longtime one-party rule for that of another.

Not a few political scientists and pundits have wondered whether the LDP might disintegrate without the unifying glue of being in office, being able to hand out cabinet posts, and all of the other perks that come with holding on to power.

Even before all of the votes were counted, Prime Minister Taro Aso announced that he would step down as party president to atone for the defeat. That was hardly a surprise, and most of his fellow members probably are thinking to themselves: Don’t let the door hit you as you leave the room.

Still, it would be hugely unfair to attribute the LDP defeat to the prime minister himself. Aso made mistakes and committed gaffes in his nearly one-year tenure, but this was a vote against his party not Aso. For that matter, his successor, Yukio Hatoyama, isn’t exactly wildly popular either.

The LDP has scheduled an election to find a new party leader on Sept. 28, a week or so after the new government is sworn in, which means that prospective candidates, who just finished weeks of grueling campaigning, will have to criss-cross the country again to win votes from the prefectural party organizations.

As of this writing no, one has thrown his or her hat in the ring, and the post is considered wide open. Some might question who really would want the job? For the first time since 1993, when the LDP fell temporarily from power in a parliamentary maneuver, the post of party president does not automatically bring with it the job of prime minister.

One possible candidate to lead the party in opposition is Hidenao Nakagawa, who tried to foment a short-lived revolt against Aso back in July. Nakagawa was defeated in his constituency, but survived by winning on the proportional voting list (in Japan candidates can file for both single-seats and the PR list.)

In electoral district after electoral district, septuagenarian LDP Diet members, men and women who had been returned in eight, ten, twelve consecutive elections, who had served as cabinet ministers or faction leaders, fell to thirty-something political neophytes, many of them women. (Some, like Nakagawa, got back by being on the proportional list).

Yet many of the LDP old guard managed to survive. These included the last three prime ministers, Aso, Yasuo Fukuda and Shinzo Abe, three men responsible for the party’s steady decline over the last few years. So did former premier Yoshiro Mori, who may hold the world record for the lowest public approval rating of any democratically elected leader during his short term.

It appears that only those stalwart Liberal Democrats Party Diet members were re-elected who were so strongly entrenched in their constituencies that they could withstand the electoral tsunami. Many others did not. The LDP lost 181 seats, including some 66 which were won by “Koizumi’s children” in the 2005 election won by Japan’s last popular premier, Junichiro Koizumi.

Many of the losers were first time Diet members, elected in the Koizumi landslide four years ago, who had not had enough time to make their local political position impregnable. As American political scientist and commentator Tobias Harris put it: “The post-election LDP may be cursed with too many leaders and too few followers.”

If the future of the party depends on bringing in new people, younger, people, people with fresh ideas, then the LDP has a long, long way to go. Only five of the new parliamentary intake are members of the LDP (and one of them was Koizumi’s the son). By contrast, more than 150 Democrats were first-time law makers.

The former ruling party was virtually obliterated in Japan’s major cities. In Tokyo, the Democrats won 20 of the 25 seats, where it previously held only one. In Osaka it won 17 seats, where it had previously held two; Aichi prefecture, centered on Nagoya, gave the Democrats all their seats. But the party also swept the board in some rural prefectures, such as Niigata.

According to exit polls, about 30 percent of normal LDP supporters switched to the Democratic Party for this election. That figure, of course, partly explains the party’s success. But it also raises the intriguing question: Were these one-time protest votes, or will many of them permanently change their allegiance? The future of the LDP may ride on that answer.

Need health Care? Emigrate

A few years back, when I was between tours as a correspondent in Asia my son asked me what I would do if I got sick, not having at the time an employer or any kind of private health insurance. Almost without thinking, I said I’d fly to Hong Kong, assuming I was well enough to get on an airplane.

On more sober reflection, I decided that this offhand remark had real possibilities. Hong Kong does not have universal health coverage, like many other countries, but it does have an excellent public hospital system. After living there for 16 years I was a permanent resident and thus eligible to use these services.

As Americans wrestle with health care, as the public debate gets more contentious, as the likelihood of the Congress enacting any kind of meaningful public health care fades, people need to think about their options. Here is my modest proposal: emigrate. In other words, move to another country that offers better health care.

Certainly, there are plenty of countries to choose from. Almost every developed country in the planet has some forms of universal coverage. What about New Zealand? It is a nice, green country, about the size of Britain with only 4 million people, very welcoming to immigrants, low crime and stunning views.

It also has a universal health care system generally paid for through taxation. Treatments are usually free or at least subsidized. There is also an option to obtain private medical insurance too. The New Zealand system is, in fact, very similar to that in Britain.

For several years I’ve been living in Japan, where I am covered by Japan’s universal national health insurance policy. All residents are covered without regard to medical preconditions or actuarial risk. The premium is graduated to the ability to pay. I just returned from my annual check-up, which is free, being paid for by the city I live in.

Of course, there is an option closer to home: move to Canada. A few years ago a friend of mine with some serious health problems, told me he was thinking of emigrating to Canada because of its comprehensive health care system. At the time I was rather shocked to hear him; now that I’m older it doesn’t seem so shocking.

One country to avoid is the People’s Republic of China. It seems to me that of the major countries in the world, China most closely resembles the U.S. in its health care policies. This seems counter-intuitive. Aren’t communist countries supposed to provide free health care?

How many times do you hear that Cuba or China or whomever may be repressive but at least the health care is free? The repressive part about China is true, but the medical care is not free.
China used to have a rudimentary free health care system. It was part of what we call the cradle-to-grave welfare and what the Chinese call the “iron rice bowl”. But with the market reforms begun in 1978 the iron rice bowl is broken, and hasn’t really been repaired. Most Chinese have to pay for their health care out of their pocket.

There is, of course, a catch. It isn’t usually enough just to visit these countries to be covered by their national plans. You have to become a citizen, or at least obtain long term residency. That means, at the least, of undergoing the hassle of obtaining a work permit to live in the country long enough to obtain residency.

This of course, does not negate the possibilities of “medical tourism”. That is, flying to another country on a tourist visa and checking into the hospital there. You have to pay the fee up front, but it is often a fraction of the cost of the same kind of care in the U.S. Thailand is a particularly attractive destination for elective surgeries of all kinds. So too are South Korea and even India.

I lived in Hong Kong in the years that led up to the handover of the former British colony to China in 1997. During those years thousands of middle-class Hong Kongers moved to Canada, Australia and to some extent the U.S. to obtain citizenship, denoted by obtaining a Canadian, Australian, etc. passport.

They had no real desire to actually live in those countries, and having obtained the coveted passport, they then returned to Hong Kong and resumed their normal lives. They looked on their shiny new travel documents as a kind of “insurance policy,” insurance that they had a bolt hole to go to should things turn out bad post 1997.

Perhaps one can view Canada, and possibly some other countries, as a new kind of bolt hole for medically disadvantaged Americans. In that case the idea of a foreign passport as a kind of “insurance policy” may take on a different kind of meaning.