"Seriously Inadequate"

If the tens of thousands of people who demonstration in Taiwan’s capital last Saturday against China’s new “anti-secession” law passed by China’s lawmakers in mid-March were really worried about their security, they might have directed some of their protest energies at their own lawmakers.

Even as they marched, the Legislative Yuan is once again considering whether to appropriate the equivalent of the $18 billion needed to purchase the arms necessary to maintain a balance of power across the Taiwan Strait that is now perceptibly moving in favor of China.

It is time now for the legislators to stop the endless debating – more like haggling – and get down to business. For if it appears that Taiwan is not ready to do what it can for its own self defense, how can it call on the help of others, the United States in particular, to come to its aid in the event China does attack?

What’s involved is the acquisition of eight new submarines, six Patriot III anti-missile batteries, and a dozen P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft. The new patrol aircraft would replace aircraft that have been in service for the better part of 40 years. The Patriot IIIwould augment the older Patriot II system protecting Taipei and extend the anti-missile umbrella to the rest of the island. The submarines would help defend against a Chinese naval blockade of the island.

President George W. Bush authorized these sales soon after he became president in 2001. Four years later Taiwan has yet to come up with the funds. The members of the opposition-controlled body have raised all kinds of objections. Some have questioned the reliability of the Patriot system, using Washington’s own assessments of the weapon’s performance in Gulf War I.

Some opposition members are still miffed that the U.S. won’t sell Taiwan top-of-the-line destroyers with anti-missile capabilities (Washington says it would consider the sales once Taiwan’s navy adapts to manning the somewhat older and less sophisticated Kidd Class destroyers.) Some even accuse Taiwan of being asked to pay “tribute” to the U.S.

Mostly the legislators balk at the price tag, citing competing demands for improved social services. It is true that the total cost is high – roughly twice Taiwan’s total annual defense budget. But it doesn’t have to be paid all at once. Indeed, the first installment would only increase defense expenditures by about 15 per cent. That would still leave defense spending below 3 per cent of GDP.

Much has been said about China’s military modernization and rising defense budgets. But few outside of official circles express much concern about Taiwan’s declining defense budgets. Yet the budget has steadily shrunk in real terms and as a proportion of the country’s gross domestic product for ten years. Defense spending amounted to 3.5% of GDP in 1995 and had fallen to 2.5% in 2004.

As far back as 1999 the then Taiwan Minister of Defense, Tang Fei, argued that defense spending was “seriously inadequate” to keep Taiwan secure. At that time Taipei was spending about 2.7 per cent of GDP on defense. He maintained that it be increased to roughly 3 per cent. Otherwise in five years China would be capable of launching an attack. That was five years ago.

American officials have politely expressed their concern over this state of affairs. Peter. W. Rodman, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, had this to say to Congress on the 25th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations act a year ago:

“We have made clear to our friends on Taiwan that we expect them to reverse this defense budget decline. Though our commitments to Taiwan are enduring, the American people and both the Executive Branch and Congress expect the people of Taiwan to make their own appropriate commitment to their freedom and security.”

The irony is that as Taiwan has become more democratic, its defense expenditures have become more subject to political pressures and competing demands. In the bad old days of martial law, the army general staff reported directly to the President, and a compliant legislature produced what funds they needed.

Now Taiwan has a civilian minister of national defense, and he has to ask for, not demand, appropriations. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s people have developed a taste for social welfare programs, and legislative candidates campaign on promises to provide them. At the same time, Taiwan’s people oppose raising taxes (which are low). It’s not an uncommon conundrum in democracies.

Opinion polls in Taiwan have consistently indicated a lack of concern about an attack from China and consequently indifference to shrinking defense budgets. Statements such as President Bush’s pledge shortly after taking office that the U.S. “would do whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself” are often interpreted as an open-ended commitment to defend Taiwan no matter what it does.

Taiwan’s main claim to American help and possibly its blood, aside from strategic considerations (Chinese submarines based on Taiwan’s east coast), is its status as a functioning democracy, But it cannot expect America to risk war with China if it is not pulling its own weight. It’s time for the people chanting “Taiwan, yes, China no” to put up or shut up.