Testing the Waters
The recent
week-long voyage of the USS Fort Worth through the region of the
South China Sea known as the Spratlys can be seen as literally testing the
waters. The provocative voyage comes at a time when the security architecture
of East Asia is changing almost by the day.
Even while
the Fort Worth was at sea, the
Japanese cabinet sent two bills to the parliament that will considerably loosen
the constitutional restraints on the use of Japan’s armed forces, allowing for
closer cooperation with allies and close associates.
The
proposed new laws, which seem certain to pass given Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s
commanding majority in both houses of parliament, put into effect the cabinet’s
decision last year to “re-interpret” the country’s pacifistic constitution to allow
for collective self-defense.
At the
same time, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (navy) has conducted joint
exercises with the Philippine Navy, and Manila announced that the US Navy would
have access to eight bases in the Philippines, including a new one on Palawan
that is close to the Spratlys.
Washington
has been increasingly concerned about how to respond do Beijing’s frantic
efforts to turn tiny atolls and reefs and other land features that barely stick
up above the water at low tide into artificial islands through land reclamation.
The
reclamation work that is taking place on half a dozen reefs in the Spratlys is
essentially turning some of them into potential mini-aircraft carriers with
runways long enough at 3,000 meters to handle high performance jet aircraft.
Japan
might be obliged to send its own patrols in the South Seas. Earlier this year
Vice Admiral Robert Thomas, Commander of the US Seventh Fleet, proposed such joint
patrols. Tokyo demurred but the new laws would make such missions possible as
they remove geographical constraints on Japanese military operations.
The USS Forth Worth is a Littoral Combat
Ship specifically designed to operate close to shore and in shallow waters,
such as those around the disputed Spratlys. It is permanently based in
Singapore, which will ultimately be home to four such ships. They are a key
element in President Barack Obama’s “Pivot” to Asia.
Beijing is
well aware of these ships and their mission. It anticipated the Fort Worth’s patrol and clearly didn’t
like it. A Chinese navy frigate shadowed the American warship throughout its
cruise through the Spratly islands, and the American ship “encountered multiple
[Chinese] navy vessels” during its patrol, according to the official Navy
website.
China’s
foreign ministry has already voiced “serious concern” over the cruise. “Freedom
of navigation does not mean that the military or aircraft of a foreign country
can willfully enter the territorial waters or the air space of another country,”
said a foreign ministry spokesman about the cruise,
Freedom of
navigation through the South China Sea is the overriding concern of both the US
and Japan. The latter obtains 80 percent of its vital petroleum supplies from
the Middle East in tankers that pass through the South Sea waters.
Neither
country takes a stand on who owns what in that ocean. The various atolls and
reefs are claimed in whole or part by at least six countries: China, Taiwan,
Malaysia, Brunei, Vietnam and the Philippines.
Adding to
the uncertainty is the so called “Nine-Dash Line” on official Chinese maps that
make it appear that China is claiming some 90 percent of the entire South China
Sea its own sovereign territory. Beijing has never clarified exactly what that
map really means.
The
Pentagon is undoubtedly carefully analyzing the results of the Fort Worth’s cruise and pondering the
next step. One option, of course, would be to continue with the solitary
patrols, avoiding close contact with any of the disputed islands, but
Washington could take things to a higher level.
One option
would be to send a warship into the twelve-mile territorial zone of one or more
of the Chinese claimed reefs. Washington does not recognize the legitimacy of
the territorial zones in the Spratlys because, under international law, an
artificial island cannot be considered sovereign territory.
The US
Navy routinely makes “Freedom of Navigation Operations” around the world to
assert freedom of navigation against countries that it believes are not
following international maritime law. An example is the Gulf of Sidra in the
Mediterranean Sea, which Libya at one time claimed as sovereign territory.
Judging by
the reaction of Beijing, any violation of the territorial waters it claims in
the South China Sea would almost certainly provoke a response.
One option
considered likely by many observers, would be for Beijing to declare an Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the Spratlys. Such zones require that
aircraft flying through the zone file a flight plan with China. It could
enforce the ADIZ with fighters based on one of the new air strips that China is
building on some of the reefs and atolls.
Beijing
surprised the world in November, 2013, when it announced a new ADIZ over much
of the East China Sea, including the disputed Senkaku/Daioyu islands. But it
did not extend along the entire Chinese coast line. Beijing left open the
possibilities of announcing more ADIZs.
Countries
with ADIZs usually extend them along their entire coastline. The fact that
Beijing has made no new announcements in the past year and a half strongly
suggests that they are not really there for defense purposes. Rather they are
counters in the on-going geopolitical contest over who owns the seas.
If Beijing
were to declare and ADIZ in the deep South China Sea, hundreds of miles from any mainland based aircraft, suggests that they see this move as
a means of annexing a chunk of the South China Sea without really annexing it.
Todd Crowell is the author of the Coming War between China and Japan published as an Amazon Single.