An Excuse to Rearm?
“The
killing is the price that Japan has paid for its support of Washington [war on
terror]”, said the China Daily, the
official organ of the Chinese Communist Party. It went on to speculate that Abe
will eventually use the crisis as an excuse to repeal the country’s pacifistic
constitution
The Global Times, a newspaper published by
the communist party but aimed at international readers, predicted that the
crisis would be a new excuse for Japan to relax the restrictions now imposed on
its armed forces. “Abe is more concerned about promoting rightest policies than
rescuing hostages.”
Of course,
it is hardly news that relations between China and Japan are in the pits these
days, or that Beijing holds a special animas for Japan’s prime minister or that
everything Tokyo does these days is automatically seen as a march toward “remilitarization.”
Tokyo
supports the international coalition against the Islamic State, organized by
Washington. It’s most concrete contribution, is a $200 million package of
nonmilitary aid for coping with refugees that Abe announced in Cairo during a
trip to the Middle East.
The
Islamic State promptly latched on to that figure and turned it into a ransom
demand that they soon dropped after killing Yukawa and substituted new demands
for releasing a convicted terror bomber now in Jordanian custody.
Abe has
talked a lot about wanting to raise Japan’ profile in international affairs,
yet it would be misleading to say that this effort raised Japan’s profile to a
higher level. After all, Tokyo contributed billions of dollars to the coalition
formed in 1991 to retake Kuwait and was shocked at how little thanks it got.
So when
the second Iraq War came around in 2003, Tokyo was determined to send at least
some “boots on the ground” in the form of a construction battalion that operated
under severe restrictions to conform with the constitution. Japanese navy
oilers also refueled coalition ships supporting the war in Afghanistan.
The latter
two actions required special legislation. The Abe government is currently
considering a series of new amendments to the Self Defense Forces Act to enable
even closer military cooperation between Japan and the United States and
possibly other “allies.”
So it is
not wrong to speculate on how the hostage crisis, once it is resolved, will
impact Japan’s future defense posture. There have, after all, been plenty of signs that Abe’s government wants
to enhance the country’s military, such as has increasing defense spending in a
modest way since taking power two years ago.
In July
the cabinet issued a statement “re-interpreting” the constitution to allow for
“collective defense”, which mainly means working in concert with it main ally,
the United States, and potentially other countries with which it has a close
relationship.
Even as
the hostage crisis unfolded. Japan’s defense minister Gen Nakatani and foreign
minister Fumio Kishida were in London discussing closer cooperation on jointly
developing new armaments. Tokyo last year relaxed its traditional ban on
weapons’ exports.
Before collective
defense can go into effect, however, the Japanese parliament has to pass a
bunch of new laws and amendments to the Self-Defense Act. This was to have been
accomplished in the last session, but the Abe administration pulled the bills
rather than have this divisive issue become part of the snap election last
month.
The new
parliament, elected late last year, went into session this past week, will be
called on to pass those laws. Opinion polls have shown the public about equally
divided on the issue. There has been no new polling on this issue since the
hostage crisis broke out.
The
hostage crisis cuts two ways. In one sense it raises long-standing fears among
the Japanese public that their country will be dragged into Middle East
conflicts as part of American-led coalitions. In that respect, many fear any
weakening of the constitution’s prohibition on using force to resolve
international disagreements.
The call
for collective defense is primarily motivated by perceived growing threats from
China and North Korea. China and Japan are involved in a heated dispute over
ownership of several islands in the East China Sea, known as the Senkaku in
Japan and Daioyu in China.
But some
of the proposed amendments could impact the Middle East, such as provisions
allowing the Japanese navy to sweep mines in the Persian Gulf, for example.
Japan is entirely dependent on the region for petroleum imports.
On the
other hand, the crisis adds to Japan’s current sense of impotence and helplessness
to defend its citizens in danger. It is deeply humiliating to Japan’s leaders
that they have essentially had to out-source the handling of the hostage crisis
to Jordan.
The same
sense of impotence was felt in an earlier hostage crisis that took place in
Algeria just one month after Abe took office in December, 2012. Militants took
over an oil refinery in a remote part of Algeria. Ten Japanese hostages died
when the Algerian Army stormed the site.
The
Japanese killed in that incident were not adventurers like Yukata, drawn to
danger, but ordinary engineers working on an international infrastructure
project in a presumably safe country like thousands of other soldiers for Japan
Inc.
The
incident shattered the illusion that Japan was largely immune to international
terrorism from radical Muslims. Having to depend on the special forces of
another country was especially galling. There were no Japanese forces trained
in these kinds of operations and no legal grounds for Tokyo to use them even if
they existed.
Todd Crowell is the author of The Coming War between China and
Japan